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ABSTRACT 
 
The prevalence of low income for children, especially for children in lone-parent families, varies 
considerably across countries. This paper considers five sets of hypotheses that may explain this 
cross-national variability of child poverty. The tentative conclusion from this analysis in 20 
countries is that reducing child poverty, and in lone-parent families in particular, requires several 
approaches. Provisions that would discourage teenage childbearing would have their importance, 
as would opportunities for lone mothers to work. More important is the generosity of social 
expenditure applying to individuals and especially to families. The present analysis also shows 
the advantages of encouraging joint custody, along with special provisions for lone parents, and 
child support through advance maintenance payments.  
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Children, social assistance and outcomes: cross national 
comparisons 
Roderic Beaujot and Jianye Liu 
University of Western Ontario 
 
The prevalence of low income among children, especially for children living in lone-parent 
families, varies considerably across countries. Many authors have pondered over the differences 
showing that the rates of low income for children in lone-parent families are under 10 percent in 
countries like Belgium, Finland, and Sweden, while the rates are over 40 percent in Australia, 
Austria, Canada, Germany, United Kingdom, and the United States.  Several questions have 
been analysed in seeking to explain these differences: the extent to which mothers are considered 
to be employable (Baker, 1996; Gornick et al., 1996; Millar, 1996; Lewis, 1993), the relative 
economic status of women (Kilkey and Bradshaw, 1999; Solera, 1998; Bianchi, 1996), the 
generosity of social assistance provisions (Phipps, 1999, 2001; Kenworthy, 1998; Smeeding et 
al., 1997; Baker, 1996), or the extent of compliance to support obligations from non-resident 
parents (Kunz et al., 2001; Garfinkel et al., 1998). Many studies focus on lone motherhood rather 
than on children in lone-parent families (e.g. Kiernan et al., 1998).  
 
The purpose of this paper is to compare the relative importance of various possible factors in 
understanding the variation in these child poverty outcomes. While other studies make reference 
to the demographics (Nichols-Casebolt and Krysik, 1995; Rainwater and Smeeding, 1995; 
Gornick and Pavetti, 1990), we will systematically consider the demographics associated with 
the prevalence of lone parenthood, the teenage fertility rate or the percent male in lone-parent 
families. After considering the average per capita income, the next second set of variables 
considers the generosity of social transfers, and the transfers toward families in particular. The 
next set of considerations relates to women’s labour market status, particularly for lone parents. 
These explanatory factors are compared to three specific policy orientations: the extent of state 
involvement in ensuring child support, the extent of differential state support for lone parents, 
and the extent of joint custody.   
 
THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
The broad theoretical context is that of the relative priority given to the welfare of children by 
adults and by states. The economic well-being of children has been the focus of considerable 
attention, including the all party proposition in the Canadian Federal Parliament to end child 
poverty by the year 2000. The intentions are good both from parents and at the level of the 
society. For instance, the demographic transition has been interpreted as a focus on quality rather 
than quantity of children.  In a recent survey on orientations to having children, there was a 
rather prevalent norm to the effect that one should not have children if one cannot properly care 
for them (Beaujot and Bélanger, 2001).  Asked why they would not have more than a given 
anticipated family size, the reasons were often described in terms of the time and energy that 
children take from you, given other things that you also want to do, and given that you want to 
do the very best for each child. 
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At the societal level, fewer children also allows more resources to be allocated for each child. 
Given smaller numbers, there is a need to ensure that these “precious” human resources are not 
wasted. Of course there are other needs both in families and at the societal level. At the societal 
level, one can argue that other needs have been heard more strongly. As a former Canadian 
Minister of Health from the 1980s, Bégin (1987) observed that among the three main client 
groups for social spending priority, the elderly have been most successful, women have had 
intermediate success, and children have been the least successful.  
 
Within families, the other needs include the well-being of adults themselves, which do not 
necessarily overlap with those of children. If the first demographic transition can be read as a 
move from child quantity to child quality, the second transition involves a series of family 
changes that have loosened marital relationships, as seen especially in the altered forms of entry 
and exit from relationships. While there are structural and institutional bases for this greater 
looseness in relationships, the interpersonal side is that of giving more priority to one’s own 
satisfaction. The existential revolution in intimate relationships, that Giddens (1991) has seen in 
“pure relationships” and “reproductive individualism,” has meant that conflicts between the 
interests of the group and those of the individual are more legitimately resolved in terms of one’s 
own interests over those of the family group. The logic has certainly changed from a time when 
mothers not working was justified in terms of the best interests of the child. Keyfitz (1994: 7) 
observes that the presence of children, once the main reason not to divorce, no longer plays that 
role. In talking about the gender side of demographic change over the past century, Folbre 
(2000) also speaks of the greater legitimacy for women to make decisions based on self interest. 
These various changes, that demographers have associated with the second demographic 
transition, have meant that women’s parental roles have become increasingly separated from 
marital relationships, and men have become more likely to be informal parents of their partner’s 
children. For instance, in the 1994-95 Canadian Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth, 
96.7% of all children under 12 were living with their mothers and 80.5% with their fathers 
(Beaujot, 2000: 271).   
 
These theoretical considerations suggest that there are tensions at both the family and societal 
level. That is, there are good intentions to focus on the well-being of children, but there are other 
priorities that can conflict with the priority given to children, both for parents and for states. 
 
Various factors appear relevant to explaining the extensive variability across countries in the 
poverty rates of children, in particular for children in lone-parent families. The generosity of 
social transfers needs to consider the overall level of social expenditure, but also the extent to 
which this transfer benefits children in comparison to other priorities, and the extent to which 
there are special provisions for lone parents. Also important are the market income of parents; 
this includes the extent to which parents, and mothers in particular, are working and the relative 
incomes of women. For children in lone-parent families, the labour market status of mothers 
would be particularly important, as are the transfers from the non-custodial parent. These 
transfers from the non-resident parent may in turn be partly a function of policies regarding 
custody and child support.  For instance, might there be better transfers when joint custody is 
promoted and the state is involved in ensuring child support. Given the needs of lone-parent 
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families, the demographics may play a role, especially the relative numbers of children in two-
parent and lone-parent families, the extent of teenage childbearing, and the proportion male 
among lone parents.  
 
THE CANADIAN CASE 
 
The proportion of children in lone-parent families has increased markedly in Canada as in other 
countries. Between 1971 and 1996, the proportion of children in lone-parent families has 
increased from 9.6% to 18.9% of all children at home (Statistics Canada, 1975a, 1975b, 1997). 
Over the period 1975 to 1992, Zyblock (1996) shows that the proportion with low income has 
declined in both two-parent and lone-parent families, but the changed composition toward a 
greater predominance of lone parenthood has resulted in either stable or increased levels of low-
income for all children. In particular, children with lone parents represented a third of poor 
children in 1975, compared to over half by 1992. 
 
Using market incomes, that is pre-tax/transfer, in age group 0-14, Picot et al. (1998: 14-15) show 
that the proportion below 50% of median income increased from 1981 to 1995. However, the 
post-tax/transfer poverty has been stable. That is, the tax and transfer system has had to counter 
market trends that are producing higher levels of poverty for children. This is documented by 
looking at the relative share of income from earnings and transfers. For persons with low income 
at age group 0-14, there has been a cross-over of the relative importance of earnings and 
transfers, so that by 1995 some 70% of the income was from transfers. Looking at the income 
package of the lowest quintile of children, Bradbury and Jantti (2001: 28) find that 50% or more 
of their income is due to transfers for Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, Ireland, France 
and the United States. At the other extreme of the distribution, 25% or less of the income 
package of the lowest quintile of children is due to transfers in Italy, Finland, Spain and 
Germany.  These authors conclude that market incomes are more important than transfers for 
reducing poverty. 
 
Other observations on inequality can be taken from the Canadian dispersions in family income 
(Rashid, 1999). In 1970, lone parents comprised 9.3 percent of families, compared to 14.6% in 
1995. By 1995, lone-parent families comprised 44.2% of the lowest decile in family income 
(idem, p. 13). Increasingly over this period, the top decile of families is made up of husband-wife 
families where both are working, and the bottom decile is made up of female lone-parent 
families. Thus the transfer system has had to work against both an increased inequality in market 
incomes at the family level, and changing family configurations, including a higher proportion of 
persons over age 65. In 1970, over a quarter of the bottom decile were families aged 65 and over, 
but this was reduced to 6.4% by 1995. For all families, the proportion of income from 
government transfers was 5.4% in 1970 compared to 12.0% in 1995. Government transfers now 
comprise over half of income in the two bottom deciles of family income.  
 
That is, the transfer system has been active, but it has not reduced the levels of child poverty. 
Taking children aged 0-17 in one-parent families, there has not been a large change in the 
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percent poor before transfers, but the percent receiving transfers has increased from 63.0% to 
96.2% from 1973-81 to 1988-93 (Lefebvre et al., 1996: 356-357). For all children, the percent 
poor before transfers has increased from 20.2 to 23.2 percent, but the percent receiving transfers 
has increased much more, from 39.2% to 79.1%, which has nonetheless produced stability in the 
percent poor after taxes and transfers. 
 
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS IN CHILD POVERTY 
Poverty rates are here largely taken from the Luxembourg Income Study (2002). A relative 
measure is used that considers as poor those who are 50 percent below the median income. The 
measure is first determined at the household level, taking into account size and composition, then 
attributed to individuals in the household. While there are advantages to using measures of 
poverty that are based on the consumption of resources, international comparisons are easier 
when using a relative income measure. These relative measures are closely related to the 
consumption of resources and to various welfare outcomes. We have adopted here the measure 
of 50 percent below the median income since it is the most common measure, and we are using 
the terms poverty and low income interchangeably. Data are presented for both two-parent and 
lone-mother families. Unfortunately, systematic data are not available for lone-father or total 
lone-parent families. Also, it is not possible to separate never married and ever-married lone-
mothers. The data on lone mothers are based on households where there is no spouse present. 
 
We will largely use the poverty levels post-taxes and transfers, but have reproduced Table 1 that 
compares child poverty rates before and after government taxes and transfers (Smeeding et al., 
1995). These data from the late 1980s to early 1990s indicate considerable variability especially 
in the post-transfer poverty rates for children living with lone mothers. Before transfers, these 
poverty rates are uniformly high, ranging from 32% in Italy to 80% in the Netherlands. 
However, there is a larger variation after transfers, from 60% poverty for children living with 
lone mothers in the United States, to 4% in Germany. This is the variability that needs to be 
explained. How is it that countries like Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, and 
Sweden had poverty rates for children with lone mothers of 10% or less, while these rates were 
above 40% in Australia, Canada, Ireland, and United States. It can be seen that the transfer 
system reduces the proportions poor by over 35 percentage points in Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden and United Kingdom, 
but by less than 20 percentage points in the Australia, Italy, Switzerland and the United States. 
 
Considering now only the post-transfer poverty rates, Table 2 presents the latest available data 
along with data from an earlier date. For Canada, these data confirm the results cited earlier 
(Zyblock, 1996) indicating that poverty declined in both two-parent and lone-mother families, 
but the increased predominance of one-parent families has meant that the poverty rate for all 
children has increased. Poverty levels have declined for children in two-parent families in 
Canada, Luxembourg, and Sweden. It has declined in lone-mother families in Australia, 
Belgium, Canada, France and Norway. For France, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom and the United States, poverty levels have declined for total children. 
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DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS 
 
In each of the set of indicators being considered, a first table presents the indicators, while Table 
7 shows correlations of these indicators with three measures of child poverty. Our first set of 
hypotheses relates to demographics. In particular, might the level of child poverty of given 
countries be related to the relative predominance of children living with a lone mother, the 
fertility rate at ages under 20, and the percent of lone parents that are male? 
 
The percent of children living with lone mothers has increased in all countries except Austria 
and the Netherlands. In the latest data, this proportion varies from 3.0% in Japan to 21.5% in the 
United States (Table 3). Leaving aside Japan on which we do not have comparable poverty data, 
the proportion of children living with lone mothers is lowest in Spain, Italy, Ireland and 
Netherlands, while it is highest in Sweden, United Kingdom, New Zealand and United States. 
On the other hand, the set of countries where child poverty rates are lowest include Sweden, 
Norway, Finland and Luxembourg, while they are highest in United States, Italy, United 
Kingdom and Australia. As would be expected from these distributions, there are only low 
correlations between the predominance of lone-mother families and the child poverty rates 
(Table 7). These correlations are nonetheless positive for the poverty rate among all children. 
There is slightly higher child poverty in single-mother families, along with lower poverty in two-
parent families, when there are higher proportions of lone-mother children in given countries. It 
would appear that there is some relevance to the basic demographics to the effect that higher 
proportions of lone-mother families make it harder to reduce child poverty, especially in one-
parent families. Bradbury and Jantti (2001) drew a similar conclusion: children have a greater 
likelihood of being poor when they are with a lone mother, but compared to other factors this is 
not an important reason for variation across countries.  
 
The percent of lone parents who are male varies within a narrow range, from 9.5% in 
Australia  
Figure 1. The poverty rate for children in lone-mother families
                   by fertility rate under 20, in 18 countries, 1996
fertility under 20
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to 20% in Luxembourg. Nonetheless, the higher this proportion the lower the rates of child 
poverty.  
Among the demographic indicators that were collected, the bi-variate correlation of child 
poverty is strongest with the fertility rate under age 20. These fertility rates vary extensively, 
from 58 per 1000 women aged 15-19 in the United States to under 10 in Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and Sweden. The fertility rates 
for Canada and the United Kingdom are intermediate at about 25 per 1000 women aged 15-19. 
The correlation with child poverty is illustrated in Figure 1, where New Zealand is an outlier 
having relatively high fertility under age 20 but low poverty for children in lone-mother families, 
while Germany is an outlier in the other direction, with low fertility under 20 but high lone-
mother poverty rates. While the relations are clearly not systematic, the demographics of teenage 
childbearing are more highly correlated with child poverty than the demographics of lone 
parenthood.  
 
PER CAPITA INCOME, SOCIAL EXPENDITURE AND TRANSFERS TO 
FAMILIES 
Our next set of hypotheses relates to economic and social expenditure indicators (Table 4). We 
wish to see if the per capita income, the level of social expenditure, and the distribution of this 
expenditure, are associated with child poverty for all children and for children in lone-mother 
families. While these are relative measures of income, richer countries would have more 
potential to reduce the proportion of children who are 50% below the median income. Higher 
GDP per capita is associated with slightly lower poverty in two parent families, but not for 
children in lone-parent families nor for all children. As other research indicates, higher national 
income does not produce lower real poverty (Bradbury and Jantti, 2001: 29).  
The correlations are much higher, and always in the expected direction, between child poverty 
and levels of social expenditure. Measured as a percentage of GDP, the higher the public 
revenue, the higher the transfers to households and the higher the social security expenditure, the 
lower the child poverty levels (Table 7, Figure 2). 
As would be expected, a higher proportion of family benefits (cash and service) in the total 
Figure 2. The poverty rate for children in lone-mother families
by public revenue as percentage of GDP, in 16 countries, 1996
public revenue as % of GDP
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social security expenditure also reduces child poverty, however the correlation is stronger for 
two- parent than for lone-mother families. On the other hand, when health and pensions 
comprise a higher proportion of social expenditure, there is more child poverty. This can be 
further seen in the ratio of family cash benefits over pensions and health, which correlates with 
lower child poverty. Thus there appears to be some conflict of interest between transfers to 
families and those to health and pensions. Family cash benefits are more important in 
comparison to health and pensions in Australia, Finland, Luxembourg and New Zealand, while 
they are lower in Spain, United States and Italy. 
 
At the same time, there are positive correlations between levels of poverty for children and the 
elderly. There are also particularly high correlations between child poverty and poverty levels 
for the entire population. Thus the mechanisms for reducing poverty in the various parts of the 
population must be similar, and they largely involve higher levels of taxes and transfers. 
Nonetheless, the relative priority of transfers toward families, as contrasted with health and 
pensions, also benefits children in terms of lower rates of poverty. There is not evidence here 
that these mechanisms operate differently in two-parent and in lone-mother families, although 
family benefits through cash and services have more impact on poverty in two-parent families.   
 
LABOUR FORCE STATUS OF WOMEN 
 
Especially in lone-mother families, one would expect child poverty to be lower when women are 
more involved in the labour market. Bradshaw and Bjornberg (1997: 273) show that in eleven 
countries the poverty rates of lone mothers is invariably higher, and often much higher, if they 
are not working than if they are working. Millar (1996) makes the case that various structures of 
the labour force are relevant to poverty in lone-parent families, in particular employment rights, 
services supporting employment, opportunities for education and training, and the relative 
availability of full-time and part-time jobs. She then classifies countries according to the 
employment rates of lone mothers and all mothers, and basically concludes that the treatment of 
all mothers is key to the position of lone mothers. 
 
Table 5 shows various labour market indicators of  the relative status of women. The percent 
female in the labour force in 1995 varies from under 40% in Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and 
Spain, to the range of 45 to 47% in Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and the United 
States. Higher proportions women in the labour force are related to lower poverty, but that is 
more so in two-parent than in lone-mother families (Table 7). The percent of labour force 
participation among married or cohabiting mothers is especially related to lower child poverty in 
two-parent families, while this participation in lone-mother families is associated with lower 
child poverty in corresponding families. In the latter comparison, New Zealand is an outlier with 
relatively low child poverty in single-mother families while also low labour force participation 
for lone mothers; in contrast, United States, Canada and Australia are outliers with intermediate 
lone-mother labour force participation but high poverty for children in lone-mother families 
(Figure 3).  
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The proportion female among part-time workers is also negatively correlated with child 
poverty. The percent women among full-time workers is negatively related to child poverty in 
two-parent families, but shows minimal relation to child poverty in lone-mother families. An 
index confirms these results. Multiplying the percent female in the labour force by the proportion 
female in part-time workers, this index shows a negative relation to child poverty especially in 
two-parent families, but also in lone-mother families. In the wage rate comparison, female 
earnings as a percent of male earnings slightly reduce child poverty. Although these labour 
market indicators show lower correlations with child poverty than the indicators of social 
expenditure, most of the results are in the expected direction. Two results are nonetheless 
surprising: the percent female among part-time workers reduces child poverty, and the percent 
female in full-time workers has no effect on child poverty in lone-mother families. Also, the 
earnings ratios show rather slight relationships; that is, female earnings as a percentage of male 
earnings only show a slight negative correlation with child poverty. It would appear that labour 
force participation, and proportions working full-time are particularly important to reducing 
poverty in two-parent families, while a larger proportion female among part-time workers also 
reduces child poverty. 
 
Factors associated with the labour market status of women and their relative incomes were 
investigated by Baker (1996) when comparing two countries that tended to encourage young 
mothers to work (United States and Sweden) and two that encouraged them not to be employed 
(Australia and the Netherlands). As with Baker, we find that this variable is of limited 
importance in explaining the poverty levels of children in lone-mother families. The correlations 
are typically lower than with the indicators of social expenditure. The labour force participation 
rate of lone mothers does reduce associated child poverty, but other indicators of labour market 
show only weak relationships with child poverty in lone-mother families. 
Figure 3. The poverty rate for children in lone-mother families by
labour participation rate of lone mothers, in 18 countries, 1996
% of labour participation of lone mothers
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CHILD CUSTODY AND STATE INVOLVEMENT IN CHILD SUPPORT 
This section considers three qualitative measures that pertain to child support, child custody and 
special provisions for lone parents. For the most part, the information was obtained through 
expert informants from given countries (see also Appendix A). It is hypothesised that child 
poverty, especially in lone-parent families, would be reduced through greater state involvement 
in child support, greater prevalence of joint custody, and more generous provisions for lone-
parents. These measures would result in better transfers from the non-custodial parent, and from 
the state when the non-resident parent is in default or unable to pay child support. Table 6 shows 
these indicators and the codes that were adopted.  
 
These indicators are highly correlated to child poverty. In effect, child poverty is lower with 
greater state involvement in child support, especially through advance maintenance payments, 
along with differential state support for lone parents, and greater orientation to joint custody. 
For all children, these three indicators show a similar correlation with child poverty as the extent 
of public revenue as a percentage of GDP (Table 7). As with most other correlations, these 
measures show a stronger association with child poverty in two-parent than in lone-mother 
families. 
 
There has been a prevalent orientation for mothers to have child custody, given their closer 
involvement in day-to-day care (Fine and Fine, 1994). However, there is also a recognition that 
non-resident fathers can be important to child well-being in ways that go beyond child support. 
Joint custody has increased, and certain countries have made joint custody the default condition 
in the case of separating parents (Garfinkel et al., 1998; Pearson and Thoennes, 1998). Various 
concepts have been adopted. In New Zealand and Australia, the concept of “guardianship” has 
been used, which is similar to the French “autorité parentale”. This is separate from the day-to-
day residence of children, which remains more often with mothers. For instance, in the 1996 
divorces in France, there was joint parental authority in 87% of cases, but 86% of children 
resided with their mothers (Belmokhtar, 1999). Other countries use the single concept of 
“custody,” but the distinction can still be made between the overall custodial responsibility 
which may be joint, and the day-to-day living arrangements, or physical custody, which is rarely 
equally shared by parents. Since 1996, Australia has the default condition of shared parental 
responsibility. Joint guardianship is the default condition in New Zealand and shared parental 
authority in France, while joint legal custody is the default in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden (Table 6). Except for Australia, Austria 
and Germany, these countries typically have lower child poverty; in the case of Austria joint 
custody is a recent provision (see Figure 4). In Sweden, research suggests that joint custody has 
increased parental involvement with children (Bernhardt, 1996). Using data from Wisconson in 
1986-94, Cancian and Meyer (1998) find that shared physical custody increases with parental 
income and with father’s share of total income. 
State involvement in child support typically takes one of two forms that are related to the 
degree of social responsibility for children (Client Research Unit, 2001; Corden, 1999). The state 
can be involved in reinforcing private responsibility, by establishing the appropriate level of 
child support and helping custodial parents to collect the child support payments. The other 
model has  
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generally been called advance maintenance, with the state providing the support and collecting  
as much as possible from the non-custodial parent. In some countries like Belgium, France, 
Germany, Ireland and Netherlands, the advance maintenance only applies to custodial parents 
who are on welfare. In effect, this becomes a system for states or municipalities to pay welfare to 
lone parents, then attempting to collect from the non-custodial parent. In other countries like 
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, advance maintenance at a set level applies to all lone 
parents, although non-custodial parents can be required to directly pay further amounts to the 
custodial parent (Baker, 1995). 
 
Compliance is a key question in child support, and reform efforts to increase compliance show 
mixed results (Kunz et al., 2001, Meyer and Bartfeld, 1996). Based on a 1995-96 survey of 
British fathers living apart from their children, Bradshaw et al. (1999) find that fathers are more 
likely to make child support payments if they have more contact with the child and had a longer 
relationship with the other parent, which would also be correlated with longer involvement with 
the child prior to parental separation. The most common reasons for not paying were 
unemployment and inability to afford the payments. About half of fathers never had formal 
arrangements, but the proportion who were current payers was slightly higher among those with 
no formal arrangements (idem, p. 134). In Canada, the payments are also higher when there is no 
formal arrangement (Marcil-Gratton and Le Bourdais, 1999). Some cases that are without formal 
arrangements may represent de facto joint custody. Cooperation may be easier when there are 
more resources, while scarcity can provoke conflict and state involvement.  
 
When the state involvement in child support takes the form of advance maintenance payments, 
there is lower poverty on average (Figure 5). Germany and Ireland are exceptions with relatively 
high child poverty, but the advance maintenance provisions in these two countries are minimal. 
On average, poverty is higher when state involvement takes the form of enforcement of child 
Figure 4. The poverty rate for children in lone-mother families by
the extent of joint custody, in 19 countries, 1996
% of joint custody arrangement
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support. In this case the outliers are Luxembourg, New Zealand and Switzerland which have low 
child poverty in lone-mother families along with state involvement through enforcement of child 
support. 
 
Countries also differ considerably in the extent of differential state support for lone parents 
(see Gauthier,1996: 90). Besides the provisions available to all families, and to low-income 
families in particular, some countries have additional provisions for lone parents. In Austria, lone 
parents have access to a tax credit, but this is also available to two-parent families where one 
partner is not gainfully employed. Canada uses an “equivalent to married” tax deduction wherein 
the first child of a lone-parent family receives the same tax deduction as a dependent spouse. 
Other countries have more generous provisions for lone parents. In France, this takes the form of 
Allocation Parent Isolé, while New Zealand has a Domestic Purposes Benefit, and Australia has 
a Single Parent Payment (Goodger, 1998). Norway pays family allowance for one more child 
than the actual number of children, in the case of lone parents, while lone parents in Finland 
receive higher family allowance.  Belgium and Denmark have various tax provisions, along with 
access to social housing, that are beneficial to lone parents. With its universal advance 
maintenance system, Sweden has also been included in the list of countries with special 
provisions for lone parents. These countries all have relatively low child poverty (Figure 6). At 
the same time,  
Luxembourg, and Switzerland have low levels of child poverty in lone-mother families without 
these special provisions. In Luxembourg, the overall child benefit package is judged to be “high” 
(Millar, 1996: 102). 
 
DISCUSSION 
Comparisons across countries are difficult, in part because data may not be systematic, and in 
part because there are probably alternate ways to achieve a given result. Nonetheless, this 
analysis of 20 countries suggests that several societal features are correlated with the level of 
Figure 5. The poverty rate for children in lone-mother families by ex-
tent of state involvement in insuring child support, 19 countries, 1996
The extent of state involvement in insuring child support:
1=minimal;2=enforcement of child supporrt;3=advance maintenance payments
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child poverty. The demographic variables are of lesser importance, but nonetheless higher 
proportions of lone-mother families is correlated with lower levels of poverty in two-parent 
families and higher levels of poverty in lone-mother families. The fertility rate at ages under 20 
shows a somewhat stronger correlation with child poverty, especially in lone-mother families, 
while the percent male among lone parents is related to lower child poverty, especially for all 
children but also for children in lone-mother families.  
 
The labour market characteristics of women are not strongly correlated with poverty rates of 
children in lone-mother families. The proportion female in the labour force and women’s relative 
wage rates have weak relations to child poverty in lone-mother families, but poverty rates are 
also slightly lower in countries where women comprise a larger proportion of part-time workers. 
On the other hand, a higher labour force participation among lone mothers is related to lower 
child poverty rates in lone-mother families.  It may be that the opportunities to work and 
women’s wage rates are not particularly relevant unless there is also good access and 
affordability in childcare, or unless there are policies for full employment (Baker, 1996). It can 
also make a difference whether women are pushed or pulled into the labour force. The 
encouragement to work, especially by labour market and family-friendly provisions, provides a 
different context in comparison to stipulations that push women to work through such things as 
the removal of welfare support when young mothers are considered to be “employable” (see 
Smeeding et al., 1997).  
 
The generosity of social programs, as indicated through social security expenditures as a percent 
of GDP, and the transfers to households as a percent of GDP, are more strongly correlated with 
child poverty than the labour market characteristics. In effect, there is a strong positive relation 
between the overall rate of poverty and that of children in lone-mother families. There is also 
Figure 6. The poverty rate for children in lone-mother families by
differential state support for lone parents, in 19 countries, 1996
Differential state support for lone-mother families:
0 = minimal; 1 = significant 
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indication that a higher concentration of social expenditure on family benefits, in contrast to old 
age and health benefits, is more efficient in reducing child poverty. While various typologies of 
welfare states have been used, it may be possible to develop a typology in accordance with the 
relative priority given to benefits for children and young families in contrast to elderly benefits. 
 
There is evidence that the policy context of custody, child support and the specific provisions for 
lone parents is also related to child poverty. State involvement through enforcement of child 
support obligations is less effective than advance maintenance payments. Sweden was a pioneer 
in the area of advance maintenance, with the collection from the non-resident parents 
representing about 78% of what the state pays to lone parents (Millar, 1996: 104). In addition, 
provisions aimed specifically at lone mothers can reduce child poverty. In Norway, for instance, 
lone parents receive family allowance for one more than their actual number of children, in the 
amount of 9,948 NOK ($1750 CAN) per year. Child poverty is also lower on average when joint 
custody is defined as the default condition, possibly encouraging the continued involvement of 
both parents in the well-being of children.  
 
In several ways, family change has benefited children. In particular, smaller family sizes, later 
ages at childbearing, and two-income families have permitted more transfers to children. At the 
same time, on average, children have been disadvantaged by looser marital bonds and the greater 
likelihood of living with only one parent or a step parent. In the Canadian case, the total of these 
changes was reducing the likelihood of child poverty over the period 1973 to 1988, but was 
increasing this prevalence over the period 1988-95 (Picot et al., 1998: 20). This is because the 
positive changes have largely run their course, but there is continued increase in the likelihood of 
living with a lone parent. In “Divorcing children: roles for parents and the state,” Richards 
(1994: 249) observes “that parental divorce often damages the life chances of children and the 
State could, and should, act more firmly to head off some of this damage.” Reflecting on the 
Swedish case, Bjornberg (2001) observes that laws do not seek to protect “The Family,” but to 
protect the interest of the weaker parts within families, especially the children.   
 
Children will be less vulnerable if there are more state provisions for children and if both parents 
continue to give priority to their well-being. We would argue that the latter is more likely to 
occur if the care of children is better shared between women and men (Beaujot, 2000). Stated 
differently, better sharing would reduce the cost of children to women. There is limited scope for 
policy involvement in regard to promoting the better sharing of child care by women and men in 
and out of marriage, but the default condition of joint custody may signal this orientation, and 
may encourage better involvement on the part of the non-resident parent. We also need better 
statistics on men’s involvement with childcare. For instance, there are various compilations on 
lone-mother families, but we could not locate any basic international comparisons on lone-father 
families. In many instances, one-parent families are only tabulated as lone-mother families, and 
treated as a women’s issue (e.g. United Nations, 2000).   
 
From the point of view of women, another policy issue is whether to treat all mothers the same 
or to treat lone mothers separately (Kilkey and Bradshaw, 1999; Millar, 1996). Taking the point 
of view of children, the main thrust of provisions needs to refer to all children, and to children 
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living in low-income families in particular. However, our analysis suggests that child poverty is 
on average lower if there are special provisions for children living in a lone-parent family, and if 
advance maintenance is used instead of enforcement of child support. Another question regards 
the extent to which special provisions for lone parents and advance maintenance should apply 
only to lone parents who are on welfare, or to all lone parents. While welfare provisions can be 
effective in reducing the depth of child poverty, they do not compensate for the disadvantages of 
living with one parent, especially when the other parent is unable or unwilling to parent.  
 
Our conclusion is that reducing child poverty, and in lone-parent families in particular, requires 
several approaches. Provisions that would discourage teenage childbearing would have their 
importance, as would opportunities for lone mothers to work. More important is the generosity 
of social expenditure applying to individuals and especially to families with low income. 
Besides, this analysis makes a case for provisions such as joint custody that encourage 
involvement on the part of the non-resident parent, and particular arrangements like advance 
maintenance payments when the other parent is incapacitated, along with special provisions for 
lone parents. 
 
Canada does have some such provisions, especially the equivalent to married deduction in 
income tax, which treats the first child of a lone-parent family as a dependent spouse for 
purposes of tax deduction. There are also provisions that apply to low-income families, and thus 
more often to lone-parent families, such as child tax benefits, greater access to subsidized day 
care, and higher replacement rate in employment insurance for low-income families who also 
receive child tax benefits. There are also enforcement provisions to collect child support 
payments from non-custodial parents who are in default. However, these provisions are pale in 
comparison to advance maintenance payments, or paying higher benefits to lone-mother families 
(see also Freiler and Cerny, 1998, Desrosiers et al., 1997, and Hunsley, 1997). Collecting from 
non-custodial parents does not solve the problem when they are unable to pay.  
 
As a society we have found means of accommodating for the death of parents, through life 
insurance and adoption, and for the economic incapacity of parents if that incapacity occurs at 
work, through worker’s compensation, employment insurance, and the disability provisions of 
the Canada Pension Plan. However, we have not found means to accommodate when the 
incapacity occurred in other circumstances. The provisions for low-income families solve part of 
this problem, but advance maintenance and provisions for lone parents have the advantage of 
state support regardless of the circumstance that makes the non-custodial parent unable or 
unwilling to provide.      
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Tables 
 
Table 1 
Child poverty rates before and after government taxes and transfers, 18 countries, about 1990 
 
 ---Pre-transfer child poverty rates---
 
---Post-transfer child poverty rates-- Percent lone 
mothers in 
total families 
 All 
children 
Two-parent 
households 
Lone 
mothers 
All 
children 
Two-parent 
households 
Lone 
mothers 
 
Australia 1989 19.6 11.5 73.2 14.0 7.7 56.2 12.4 
Belgium 1992 16.2 13.1 50.7 3.8 3.2 10.0 8.1 
Canada 1991 22.5 14.9 68.2 13.5 7.4 50.2 13.4 
Denmark 1992 16.0 10.6 45.0 3.3 2.5 7.3 14.3 
Finland 1991 11.5 8.6 36.3 2.5 1.9 7.5 9.5 
France 1984 25.4 22.8 56.4 6.5 5.4 22.6 6.5 
Germany 1989 9.0 5.2 43.9 6.8 2.3 4.2 9.9 
Ireland 1987 30.2 28.0 72.6 12.0 10.5 40.5 5.3 
Israel 1986 23.9 21.6 61.3 11.1 10.3 27.5 5.1 
Italy 1991 11.5 10.6 31.7 9.6 9.5 13.9 4.4 
Luxembourg 1985 11.7 8.4 55.7 4.1 3.6 10.0 6.8 
Netherlands 1991 13.7 7.7 79.7 6.2 3.1 39.5 8.4 
New Zealand 1996 30.0 20.9 79.1 7.8 6.4 15.4 21.0 
Norway 1991 12.9 4.4 57.4 4.6 1.9 18.4 15.4 
Sweden 1992 19.1 12.5 54.9 2.7 2.2 5.2 14.6 
Switzerland 1982 5.1 1.9 33.7 3.3 1.0 25.6 6.9 
U. K. 1982 29.6 22.1 76.2 9.9 8.4 18.7 13.0 
U. S. 1991 25.9 13.9 69.9 21.5 11.1 59.5 21.2 
 
Note: Date shown by country is date of latest data.  
 
Source: Smeeding, Danzinger, and Rainwater, 1995. For New Zealand, estimates were made based on data from Bob 
Stephens. 
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Table 2 
Total, elderly and child poverty rates by family type, and percent of children living in single-
mother families in 20 countries, around 1986 and 1996 
 
Country --------------Around 1986----------------- -----------------Around 1996----------------- 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Australia (94) 
 
11.9 
 
24.3 
 
14.0 
 
9.8 
 
62.2 
 
8.4 
 
14.3 
 
29.4 
 
15.8 
 
12.0 
 
46.3 
 
10.6 
Austria (95) 6.7 18.5 4.8 9.3 29.8 13.0 10.6 10.3 15.0 12.9 44.0 10.8 
Belgium (96)  4.5 10.9 4.0 3.2 19.9 4.7 7.4 15.1 6.3 6.1 8.0 8.9 
Canada (97) 11.4 10.8 14.8 11.6 50.3 9.9 11.9 5.3 15.7 10.9 45.7 14.8 
Denmark (97) 10.1 31.5 4.7 4.3 7.3 12.0 9.2 6.6 8.7 5.1 30.2 14.1 
Finland (95) 5.4 11.9 2.8 2.4 6.9 9.0 5.1 5.2 4.2 3.9 8.3 11.0 
France (94) 8.9 14.7 8.3 6.0 29.9 8.9 8 9.8 7.9 6.0 25.3 9.3 
Germany (94) 6.5 10.3 6.4 5.5 37.6 4.8 7.5 7 10.6 6.5 46.2 10.9 
Ireland (87)       11.1 14.4 13.8 14.4 35.4 5.3 
Italy (95) 10.4 13.1 11.4 11.1 18.6 5.1 14.2 12.2 20.2 20.3 30.6 5.2 
Japan (95)            3.0 
Luxembourg (94) 5.3 12.7 5.2 3.6 17.6 8.0 3.9 6.7 4.5 3.3 19.3 9.6 
Netherlands (94) 4.7 0.3 5.2 4.8 9.8 11.0 8.1 6.4 8.1 6.3 26.4 7.6 
New Zealand (96)   6.7 6.1 13.8 14.0   7.8 6.4 15.4 21.0 
Norway (95)  7.2 21.7 4.3 2.0 23.1 10.3 6.9 14.5 3.9 2.1 13.5 15.2 
Spain  (90)       10.1 11.3 12.2 12.5 25.4 4.9 
Sweden (95) 7.5 7.2 10.0 13.5 3.5 3.2 6.6 2.7 2.6 1.5 6.6 19.2 
Switzerland (92)  9.3 8.4 24.4 6.9 10.0 9.1 9.3 8.4 10.0 9.1 16.0 8.9 
U.K. (95) 9.1 7 26.0 9.5 12.5 11.9 13.4 13.7 19.8 13.9 43.5 20.7 
U.S. (97) 17.8 23.5 52.1 21.6 25.0 15.9 16.9 20.7 22.4 14.0 52.5 21.5 
 
Note:  
1. Total population poverty rate 
2. Elderly poverty rate 
3. Poverty rate for all children 
4. Poverty rate for children in two parent family 
5. Poverty rate for children in single mother families 
6. Percent of children living in single-mother families 
Date shown by country is date of latest data.  
 
Source: “Relative Poverty Rates for the Total Population, Children and the Elderly,” LIS Key Figures. 
             “Poverty Rates for Children by Family Type,” LIS Key Figures. 
From Web site: lisweb.ceps.lu/keyfigures/childpovrates.htm and lisweb.ceps.lu/keyfigures/povertytable.htm 
For New Zealand, estimates were made based on data from Bob Stephens. For Japan, census data are shown. 
Table 3 
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Demographic indicators on lone parenthood and family, in 20 countries 
 
Country  Percent of 
children in 
single mother 
family (1986) 
Percent of 
children in 
single mother 
family (1996) 
Percent of lone 
parents that are 
male (1996) 
Fertility (<20) 
(1996) 
TFR 
(1996) 
Australia   8.4 10.6 9.5 20.5 1.82 
Austria     13.0 10.8 12.7 17.5 1.40 
Belgium     4.7 8.9 17.3 11.9 1.55 
Canada      9.9 14.8 16.9 24.5 1.64 
Denmark     12.0 14.1 11.1 8.8 1.80 
Finland     9.0 11.0 15.5 9.8 1.81 
France      8.9 9.3 12.5 7.9 1.70 
Germany     4.8 10.9 16.6 9.5 0.84 
Ireland     5.3 5.3 12.8 15.4 1.84 
Italy       5.1 5.2 13 6.8 1.20 
Japan        3.0 13.5 3.9 1.39 
Luxembourg  8.0 9.6 20 10.5 1.69 
Netherlands 11.0 7.6 15 5.8 1.53 
New Zealand 14.0 21.0 15 34 2.01 
Norway      10.3 15.2 10 13.6 1.87 
Spain       4.9 4.9 15 7.8 1.18 
Sweden      3.2 19.2 16 8.8 1.73 
Switzerland 9.1 8.9 14.5 5.5 1.48 
U.K.        11.9 20.7 10 28.3 1.71 
U.S.        15.9 21.5 14.9 58.2 2.02 
 
Source: 
1. UN Demographic Year-Book, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, table 11. 
2. Recent Demographic Developments in Europe 2000, Council of Europe Publishing 
3. “Poverty Rates for Children by Family Type,” LIS Key Figures. From Web site: 
http://lisweb.ceps.lu/keyfigures/childpovrates.htm  
(Note: Ireland in “1986” and “around 1996” is data from 1987; Spain in “1986” and “around 1996” is data from 
1990; Switzerland in “1986” and “around 1996” is data from 1992.) 
4. Information from various respondents (see appendix) 
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Table 4 
Measures of GDP per capita, government receipts and social expenditure, 20 countries, 1995 
 
country  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Australia   393886 30.2 11.0 15.1 5.54 56.1 14.70 16.01 0.26 
Austria     169981 45.3 17.7 26.2 6.38 62.0 7.26 9.12 0.12 
Belgium     221497 48.6 21.3 26.9 7.30 53.6 8.06 8.54 0.15 
Canada      666957 36.2 12.7 18.6 6.74 59.8 4.38 N/A 0.07 
Denmark     119924 51.9 20.7 30.8 6.79 40.6 6.04 12.6 0.15 
Finland     96342 45.5 22.3 31.1 5.69 42.8 8.74 13.16 0.20 
France      1200066 45.6 21.0 29.7 7.46 61.0 7.42 8.64 0.12 
Germany     1744059 43.9 16.5 27.5 7.96 65.8 4.38 7.17 0.07 
Ireland     63956 34.4 13.5 19.1 5.38 44.6 8.09 8.74 0.18 
Italy       1143390 43.3 19.0 23.7 5.39 69.1 1.82 2.24 0.03 
Japan       2842472 28.8 13.4 14.0 5.64 80.2 1.46 3.07 0.02 
Luxembourg  13842 N/A N/A 23.9 5.82 53.7 9.96 11.67 0.19 
Netherlands 328096 45.0 22.5 26.6 6.45 48.5 3.71 5.02 0.08 
New Zealand 62218 N/A N/A 18.9 5.64 58.8 10.93 11.44 0.19 
Norway      101613 45.4 15.8 27.6 6.65 45.0 8.18 13.53 0.18 
Spain       597064 35.5 15.1 20.7 5.49 65.4 1.24 1.62 0.02 
Sweden      169571 51.4 22.5 33.0 7.19 42.6 6.45 11.67 0.15 
Switzerland 180841 47.6 11.1 21.0 6.97 63.6 5.01 N/A 0.08 
U.K.        1096228 N/A 5.9 22.5 5.90 54.2 8.32 10.46 0.15 
U.S.        7038400 31.1 12.2 16.1 6.26 74.2 2.11 4.09 0.03 
 
Note: 
1. GDP per capita in US $ PPP  
2. Public revenue as percentage of GDP  
3. Transfers as percentage of GDP  
4. Social security expenditure percentage of GDP 
5. Public expenditure on health, percentage of GDP 
6. Percentage of old age and health in social expenditure 
7. Family cash benefit percentage of social expenditure 
8. Percentage (family cash + service) in social expenditure 
9. Family cash benefit/(old age + health) 
 
Source: OECD HEALTH DATA 2000. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 29 COUNTRIES. Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development. Paris, France. OECD publications. 2000 
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 Table 5 
Labour market status of women in 1986 and 1995, and fertility measures in 1995, 20 countries 
 
Country 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Australia   39.5 42.7 69.2 2955 43.2 56.6 43.5 82.0 
Austria     39.4 42.7 84.2 3595 42.8 46.7 58.7 79.0 
Belgium     40.5 43.4 82.3 3572 41.9 61.7 69.0 75.0 
Canada      42.5 45.0 68.8 3096 45.4 64.5 60.7 82.0 
Denmark     46.4 45.7 68.1 3112 45.5 85.2 69.8 85.0 
Finland     46.2 47.1 64.2 3024 48.0 70.9 65.8 73.0 
France      42.1 44.6 79.1 3528 44.4 68.9 83.2 79.0 
Germany     39.0 42.6 86.3 3676 42.5 41.5 40.6 73.0 
Ireland     30.8 37.7 72.4 2729 37.9 32.2 23.0 71.0 
Italy       35.6 36.6 70.8 2591 35.3 41.4 69.8 79.0 
Japan       39.8 40.5 70.2 2843 40.5 54.7 88.3 45.0 
Luxembourg  50.0 36.3 89.2 3238 36.2 45.4 74.1 56.0 
Netherlands 34.5 41.4 76.5 3167 40.9 52.6 40.5 75.0 
New Zealand 43.8 44.2 74.7 3302 44.3 58.5 27.1 68.0 
Norway      42.9 45.7 80.7 3688 46.5 77.9 61.6 87.0 
Spain       N/A 38.0 77.1 2930 34.8 38.4 68.8 67.0 
Sweden      47.7 47.9 76.8 3679 48.3 81.1 70.8 89.0 
Switzerland 37.1 40.9 83.9 3432 40.6 N/A N/A N/A 
U.K.        41.0 43.8 81.8 3583 44.9 62.8 41.7 68.0 
U.S.        43.8 45.7 68.7 3140 46.1 64.5 60.7 68.0 
  
Note: 
1. Percentage of female in labour force, in 1986 
2. Percentage of female in labour force, in 1995 
3. Percentage of female in part-time* labour force, in 1995 
4. Index = product of 2 and 3 
5. Percentage of female in full-time labour force, in 1995 
6. Percentage of labour participation of married cohabiting mothers 
7. Percentage of labour participation of lone mothers 
8. Female earnings as percentage of male earnings 
* Part-time employment refers to persons who work lass than 30 hours per week in their main job. Data include only 
persons declaring usual hours worked. 
 
Sources: 
1. OECD, Labour Force Statistics, 2001, Pp 23, 39 
2. From OECD Historical Statistics 1970-1999, 2000 
3. OECD HEALTH DATA 2000 
4. Bradshaw and Bjonberg, 1997: 275-276 
5. Evelyne Huber, Charles Ragin, and John D. Stephens. Comparative Welfare States Data Set. Northwestern 
University and University of North Carolina, 1997. For details, see: 
http://www.lisproject.org/publications/welfaredata/welfareaccess.htm 
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Table 6 
Indicators of child custody, state involvement in child support, 20 countries 
 
Country  A B C D E F G 
Australia 5 2 0 69 19 8 4 
Austria 5 2 0 75 15 10 0 
Belgium 5 3 1 NA NA 60 NA 
Canada 3 2 0 61 11 28 0 
Denmark 5 3 1 NA NA 60 NA 
Finland 5 3 1 8 1 91 0 
France 5 3 1 11 2 87 0 
Germany 5 3 0 22 2 76 1 
Ireland 2 3 0 NA NA 10 NA 
Italy 1 1 0 91 5 4 1 
Japan 1 1 0 80 16 0 4 
Luxembourg NA 2 0 NA NA 10 NA 
Netherlands 5 3 0 NA NA 65 NA 
New Zealand 5 2 1 74 13 13 0 
Norway 5 3 1 9 1 90 0 
Spain 1 1 0 NA NA 10 NA 
Sweden 5 3 1 9 0.4 90 0.6 
Switzerland 2 2 0 85 11 3 1 
United Kingdom 1 2 0 90 10 0 0 
United States 3 2 0 68 12 20 0 
 
Note: 
A. Extent of joint custody:  
1 = not permitted or under 5%;  
2 = 5-14%;  
3 = 15-34%;  
4 = 35-59%;  
5 =60% or higher, or default condition. 
B. Extent of state involvement in ensuring child support:  
1 = minimal;  
2 = enforcement of child support;  
3 = advance maintenance payments. 
C. Extent of differential support for lone parents (see text):  
0 = minimal. 
1 = significant 
D. Custody arrangements: percent mother only 
E. Custody arrangements: percent father only 
F. Custody arrangements: joint 
G. Custody arrangements: other 
 
Sources: 
1. Information from various informants (see appendix)  
2. Joint custody has been estimated by the author based on other information for Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg 
and Spain. 
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Table 7 
Correlations of child poverty with various indicators, about 1996 
 
Correlation (Pearson's r)  1 2 3 
Percentage of children living in single-mother families 0.138 -0.193 0.209 
Fertility under 20 0.553* 0.309 0.495* 
Total Fertility Rate -0.112 -0.233 -0.158 
Percent of lone parent families that are male -0.335 -0.303 -0.288 
   
GDP per capita in US$ -0.078 -0.227 0.061 
Public revenue, percentage of GDP -0.705** -0.620* -0.665** 
Transfers to households, percentage of GDP -0.663** -0.533* -0.590* 
Social security expenditure, percentage of GDP -0.658** -0.624** -0.533* 
Public expenditure on health, percentage of GDP -0.350 -0.500* -0.092 
Old age and health, percentage of social expenditure 0.632** 0.591** 0.492* 
Family cash benefit, percentage of social expenditure -0.304 -0.321 -0.163 
Family cash and services, percentage of social expenditure -0.451 -0.543* -0.243 
Ratio of family cash benefit to old age and health benefits -0.423 -0.424 -0.284 
   
Elderly poverty rate 0.514* 0.460 0.419 
Total population poverty rate 0.945** 0.850** 0.747** 
    
Labour force: percentage female -0.243 -0.484* -0.113 
Part time: percentage female -0.263 -0.241 -0.141 
INDEX = product of last two rows -0.406 -0.568* -0.205 
Full time: percentage female -0.209 -0.466* -0.053 
Labour participation rate of married/cohabiting mothers -0.372 -0.571* -0.337 
Labour participation rate of lone mothers -0.247 -0.238 -0.326 
Female earnings as percentage of male earnings -0.141 -0.162 -0.082 
   
Extent of joint custody -0.672** -0.739** -0.446 
      Default condition or 60% or higher -0.688** -0.732** -0.365 
      Not permitted or under 5% 0.472* 0.592** 0.131 
Extent of state involvement in ensuring child support from absent 
parent (Spearman's rho or rank correlation coefficient) 
-0.607** -0.603** -0.355 
      Minimal 0.308 0.530* -0.008 
      Enforcement of child support 0.422 0.262 0.411 
      Advance maintenance payments -0.607** -0.585** -0.402 
Extent of differential state support for lone parents -0.679** -0.676** -0.686** 
 
Note: 
1. Percentage of child poverty  
2. Percentage of child poverty in two parents families  
3. Percentage of child poverty in single mother families 
4. * Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).  
5. ** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Source: see Tables 2-6 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Information on custody, state involvement in ensuring child support, provisions for lone parents, 
and proportion male among lone parents, 20 countries.  
 
Australia: Joint custody mostly the case (default) for guardianship (major decisions like 
education). Since 1996, “guardianship” has been replaced by the notion of parental 
responsibility, “custody” by “residence” and “access/visitation” by “contact.” For the most part, 
where child lives is not decided by courts, residence can be joint if worked out by parents. Child 
support assessed on the basis of level of income of both parents. Parents on social assistance 
must take reasonable action to collect child support and this is deducted from the welfare 
payments so that welfare payments for children are only a top-up to child support payments. In 
June 2001, 9.5% male payees from Australian Child Support Scheme, covers 85-95% of all sole 
parent families. (Peter McDonald, Colin Matthers, Allan Shephard, Margaret Harrison, Bruce 
Smyth).          
     
Austria: Joint custody is permitted as of 1 July 2001, since then it is the normal form but in the 
first six months of operation, it seems that joint custody is still not very common; if parents do 
not agree the judge decides (Maria Steck). In 2000, among all children living with a lone parent, 
12.7% were living with father (Statistics Austria). The state enforces child support by collecting 
from the absent parent; if the parent is out of the country or incapable of paying, the parent can 
collect from the state. Some two or three years ago, probably at least 75% of custody was 
granted to the mother (Astrid Deixler-Hubner). Lone parents have access to a tax credit (negative 
income tax), also available to two-parent families where one partner is not gainfully employed 
(Helmut Wintersberger). 
 
Belgium: Joint custody is the default condition; the courts may but rarely do deviate from this 
arrangement. Child support is collected from absent parent but they may escape. There is an 
“embryo” of state advance in the form of commune level social services; they sometimes 
advance payments to be collected later from the absent parent. The targeted schemes for lone 
parents include extra tax cuts, priority in social housing; also the general tax and social security 
system is favourable for single parents. There are no centralized judicial statistics to obtain data 
on custody arrangements. The 17.3% male among lone parents is from the 1991 census; it is 
slightly over-estimated because it includes some cases where a lone-parent family lives with 
their own parent who may be listed as head of the family (Johan Surkyn). 
 
Canada: Joint custody has increased from 1.2% in 1986 to 27.6% in 1997, but this is just for 
court orders (Statistics Canada, 2000). State is involved in enforcing child support, on the bases 
of a formula. Minimal additional support for lone parents besides that offered to low-income 
families; this takes the form of an “equivalent to married income tax deduction” where the first 
child of a lone-parent family receives the same deduction as a dependent spouse (Rod Beaujot). 
 
Denmark: Joint custody is the default condition, even for couples who were cohabitants rather 
than married. Housing subsidies are such that lone parents have advantages, based on income 
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level and number of people in the household, parts of the curve benefit lone parents to the point 
that there is a debate regarding people who still live together but divorce in order to declare a 
lone-parent family. The majority are joint custody but the figures are not known because the 
courts do not register this information. On 1 January 2001, for children under 18 living with one 
parent, 11.1% are living with the father (Jens Bonke).    
 
Finland: A 1984 law launched the definition of joint custody, 91% joint in 2000, 1999 law has 
advance maintenance of 702 FIM (118 EUR) which the state then seeks to collect from absent 
parent. Family allowance is increased by 33 EUR for children of single parents (Muuri Anu) 
 
France: Parental authority is supposed to be joint. State may pay food pension directly to mother 
and collect from father, but they are reluctant because this is aggressive to father (Laurent 
Toulemon, Brigitte Munoz-Perez with booklet). There are two benefits for lone parents: 
Allocation Soutien Familial benefit for families with no second parent, and Allocation de Parent 
Isolé which is means tested (Client Research Unit, 2001: 12). The 1990 census shows 12.5% 
male among lone parents with children under 20. The 1994 survey gives 9.2% living with father 
among children living with only one parent.     
 
Germany: Only one parent has legal custody, other arrangements are private. Advance 
maintenance payments which is then collected (demand of payment) from the absent parent 
(Birgit Fix). In 2000, the mother had custody in 21.6% of cases, father in 1.5, joint for 75.5 and 
other in 1.4%. There is a male head in 16.6% of lone-parent families (Htrud Beyer).  
 
Ireland: Joint custody is allowed on a case by case basis, as the court determines is in the best 
interest of the child; when there was no marriage, the father can petition for guardianship. But 
joint custody is probably under 10%, the majority are mothers; even with joint custody the 
mother is typically responsible for day to day questions. Parents are liable to support their 
children; for lone parents on welfare the state pays the benefit and seeks to collect from the 
absent parent, assessed on the means of the absent parent, up to the full amount of the welfare. 
For lone parents who are not on welfare, the courts can order payments which can be taken from 
earnings. The “one-parent family benefit” is available regardless of how the parent got to be a 
lone parent, to lone parents on welfare. This pays allowable receipted child care costs to parents 
on welfare where the lone parent is working and receiving a certain level of welfare. These 
childcare costs are allowed within a means test, with gradual reduction in the amount received on 
welfare when the lone parent returns to work. Childcare costs are not allowable for tax deduction 
for lone parents not on welfare. According to the last quarter of 2001, there were 22,400 male 
and 152,600 female lone-parent families with children under 18. When it is men lone parents, the 
majority (73%) have all children over age 15 (Valerie Richardson). 
 
Italy: Divorce requires three years of separation, both are low, joint custody permitted as of 
1970, 3.9% joint custody in 1998 (Rossella Palomba) 
 
Japan: Joint custody is not allowed, most divorces are not through the court, minimal state 
involvement in collecting child support. In 1995 census, 3.0% of children under 18 are living 
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with a lone-mother, 13.5% of lone parents are male and 13.2 % of children under 18 living with 
a lone parent are living with a lone-father (Kiyosi Hirosima). 
 
Luxembourg: There are some joint custody in fact, but does not know how this is handled 
legally, no advance maintenance payments, minimal specific support for lone parents (some 
things with taxation), custody allocation not available. In the 1991 census, there were 11,497 
(7.9% of households) lone parent households, of which 20% were fathers with children (Irene 
Zanardelli). Generosity of child-benefit package judged to be “high” for lone parents (Millar, 
1996: 102). 
 
Netherlands: Client Research Unit (2001: 14-15) says that there are no special benefits for lone 
parents; child support system has only been operational since 1997, no system of advance 
maintenance. Since 1998, joint legal custody (“joint-parental authority”) is the default condition, 
both parents stay responsible for the education and upbringing of the child, a given parent can 
petition for sole custody but the court is not inclined to grant these requests unless the parents 
have such serious communication problems that the welfare of the children is in danger. In 1999 
some 62% were joint at that is higher now. If there is a conflict, one parent can petition the court 
for sole custody. Mothers on welfare receive child support from the state and the state collects if 
possible from the absent parent. No other special provisions for lone parents. (Erik Nicolai). On 
1 Jan 2001, in 85% of lone-parent families the parent is a woman (Marloes Lammerts) 
 
New Zealand: Under the Guardianship Act 1968, both biological parents have guardianship over 
their child (the right to make decisions regarding education and well-being, regardless of the 
custody arrangements (day-to-day living arrangements of the child). State enforces child support 
which is assessed on the income of the non-custodial parent; parents on social assistance are 
required to name the liable parent for collection of child support, with a financial penalty for 
non-compliance. Child support is paid directly to custodial parent if they are not on social 
assistance, and retained by the government if they are on social assistance and the amount is less 
than the rate of benefit payable. The Domestic Purposes Benefit has varied over time but it was 
established as a statutory benefit for lone parents in 1973 (Goodger, 1998). The data on custody 
arrangements by parents date from 1990; they are no longer collected (Kay Goodger). For 
children under 18 who are not in full-time employment in 1996, 12.5% of those living with only 
one parent lived with a father. The child poverty rates (disposable income) in 1996 were 15.4% 
for children living with one parent, 6.4% with two parents and 7.8% for all children. The 
Domestic Purposes Benefit is just around the 50% threshold, and it is good at keeping sole 
parents out of extreme poverty, but not good at removing less extreme poverty or hardship (Bob 
Stephens).  In 1996, 21% of dependent children under 18 lived with a lone mother, 3% with a 
lone father, 24% overall (Kay Goodger). 
 
Norway: There is a child support advance of NOK 13,440 per child per year, lone parents 
entitled to child benefit for one child more than they actually have (National Insurance 
Administration, 2000). Default condition is joint custody, unless the parents agree differently; if 
parents have never married, mother has sole custody unless the parents have agreed differently. 
About 10 percent of lone parents are male (Marit Ronsen, Randi Kjeldstad). The courts can 
 
 25
decide on joint legal custody, but not on joint physical custody; 90% of married couples choose 
to have joint legal custody after divorce, there are not statistics on the unmarried couples. About 
10% of children under age 18 who live with a lone parent, lives with the father (Birgitte 
Gulbrandsen). A sample survey done by Jensen and Clausen in 1997 shows that 88% of children 
live with their mother, 8% with their father and 4% stay 50% with each parent, that is joint 
physical custody after separation of both married and unmarried couples. 
 
Spain: Custody is practically always allocated to the mother, fathers rarely have custody, joint 
custody does not exist. The courts can order non-paying fathers to pay child support. Until 1999, 
there were no special provisions for lone parents, but now they have a personal minimum tax 
deduction of 5410 euros compared to 3305 for others.   
 
Sweden: Joint custody is the default option for married and previously married parents, and it 
can be invoked by parents who are not married. This refers to legal custody, not actual physical 
custody; parents are to make joint decisions in matters that deal with the child, for example with 
whom the child should reside, visitation rights, which school the child should attend. After 
separation, 84% of children co-reside with their mother and 16% with their father. Advance 
maintenance, with the state paying the resident parent and collecting as much as possible from 
the absent parent. Of children whose biological parents separated in 1999, 9% have mother only, 
0.4% father and 90% joint custody. For all children 1-17 not living with both parents it is 12% 
mother, 1% father and 87% joint.  (Eva Bernhardt, Elisabeth Landgren-Moller). 
 
Switzerland: According the former law as well as according the revised divorce law (in force 
since 2000), custody has to respect the children’s well-being. Empirically, more than 4 out of 5 
children co-reside with their mother. The proportion of joint-custody is increasing. However, 
there exist hardly any valid data, due in part to the fact that cantonal jurisdiction has a wide room 
to interpret the federal law. A huge heterogeneity between cantons is the result (Beat Fux). 
 
United Kingdom: Custody is defined as parental responsibility rather than custody; residence 
orders are 90% with the mother, 10% with the mother, “joint and other” are not used. The state 
sets levels of child support and collects these through Child Support Agency, mothers on benefit 
must use this system, this is then largely deducted from their benefits. Lone parents get a small 
supplement to welfare payments and to the universal child benefit. (Mavis Maclean, Jane Lewis) 
 
United States: States are required to withhold child support obligations from wages of non-
resident parents who are delinquent. Joint custody authorized in 43 states (Garfinkel et al., 1998: 
23, 222). There is no family allowance and minimal differential support for lone parents. After 
the 1996 welfare reform, lone mothers can only receive five years of welfare in their lifetime 
(Chien-chung Huang). Among custodial parents of children under 21 living in families that had a 
parent not living in the home in 1998, 19.7% had a joint custody agreement, and 14.9% of 
custodial parents were fathers (Table B of Current Population Reports, October 2000, P60-212). 
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